



The annual average rate of inflation in the GDP deflator for 1980
was 10.1 percent. By 1984, the same measure had dropped to 4.4
percent, and from 1990 through the end of 1993, the rate of inflation has
averaged 3.2 percent, deviating only moderately from that average over
the period. From 1981 to 1984, the civilian unemployment rate averaged
8.6 percent, peaking at 10.7 percent in the fourth quarter of 1982. A
common interpretation of this episode is that intentionally contraction-
ary monetary policy caused the rise in unemployment, and the fall in
inflation was a consequence of the high unemployment rate. Under this
interpretation, the period from 1982 to the present was a successful
disinflation engineered by the Federal Reserve.
The disinflation was evidently successful insofar as it lowered the
inflation rate. But was it in any sense an optimal disinflation? Was the
path that the real economy took during the course of disinflation
satisfactory? Did the Federal Reserve move its instrument so as to obtain
the desired rate of inflation while minimizing the disruption to the real
economy? If not, what course would have been better?
Fuhrer (1994) considers one way of assessing the performance of
monetary policy. The measure is a steady-state, rather than a path-
specific, notion of optimality. A policy is considered optimal if, given
relative preferences (distastes may be a better word) over deviations of
policy goals from their targets, the policy minimizes the weighted
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average of the unconditional variances implied by the policy for policy
goals. Thus, an optimal monetary policy according to this metric will
systematically set the policy instrument in response to deviations of
policy goals--usually inflation and real output from their targets so as
to minimize this weighted average. The weights on inflation and real
output reflect the monetary authority’s relative distaste for inflation and
real output deviations. An optimal policy frontier depicts the minimum
attainable combination of variances for all possible preferences (weights
on inflation and output variance), given the structure of the economy.
This paper explores the relationship between the optimal policy
frontier and another, more commonly used measure of monetary policy
performance, the sacrifice ratio entailed in altering the inflation rate. The
sacrifice ratio is defined as the discounted percentage point shortfall of
output below its potential, per point of inflation reduction. In many
macroeconometric models, the size of the sacrifice ratio does not depend
on the path that the economy follows during a disinflation; it is a fixed
constant that translates points of inflation decrease into points of lost
output and employment. In the contracting model considered here, the
sacrifice ratio is not a constant; it depends on the rate at which the
monetary authority disinflates. Because multi-period nominal contracts
are outstanding at any particular time, a faster disinflation will cause
greater output disruption (other things being equal), while a slower
disinflation will yield less output disruption.
While the link from slower disinflation to less real disruption seems
plausible, others have argued the reverse (see, for example, Ball 1994).
If more rapid disinflations are also more credible disinflations, and if
enhanced credibility decreases the stickiness of prices and inflation,
then a more vigorous disinflation could lower the sacrifice ratio. How-
ever, the importance of credibility in the conduct of monetary policy
must be viewed as marginal at best. It is hard to argue that the high cost
of the disinflation in the 1980s arose because monetary policy did not act
credibly. The Fed visibly and aggressively raised short-term rates in the
early 1980s, pushing the short real rate over 10 percent in early 1981,
with annual average real rates of 5 to 8 percent from 1981 to 1984. Still,
because the link between monetary policy and the sacrifice ratio in this
paper arises through the overlapping contract structure in the model,
the conclusions reached here must be viewed as model-dependent.
Throughout the paper, monetary policy is characterized as a linear
reaction function in which the short-term nominal interest rate is moved
in response to deviations of policy goals from their desired values. The
range of policies considered is thus limited to those that differ in the
policy goals pursued and in the coefficients that determine the vigor
with which the instrument responds to deviations of goals from targets.
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the actual conduct of monetary policy. Empirically, the reaction function
captures most of the systematic variation of the short nominal rate.1
The next section briefly describes the data and the model used here
to assess the performance of monetary policy. Next, the sacrifice ratios
implied by the model are computed for a wide variety of policy
responses, and the impact of backward- versus forward-looking policy
responses on the sacrifice ratio is estimated. The optimal policy frontier
for this model is then displayed, as derived in Fuhrer (1994). The
sacrifice ratios along the optimal policy frontier are computed, and
interactions between the two measures of monetary policy performance
are considered.
The Data
A minimal characterization of monetary policy requires a descrip-
tion of the instrument of policy, here taken to be a short-term interest
rate, as well as its targets, which include the rate of inflation, the growth
rate of real output, and/or the real output gap. The transmission channel
from policy instrument to ultimate goals also involves these variables.
Thus, the data on which this study focuses are described in Table 1.
Table 1





log of the implicit GDP deflator
inflation rate, 4 z~pt
quarterly federal funds rate
log of per capita GDP ($1987)
deviation of Yt from trend, 1965:1 to 1993:1
log of M2
Table 2 presents the results of univariate augmented Dick.ey-Fuller
tests for the data series of interest. The log of per capita output appears
trend stationary. The inflation rate and the federal funds rate appear to
be at best borderline stationary. Because monetary policy may have
shifted the mean of the inflation process (and possibly its order of
integration) over time, these longer sample tests for mean reversion may
not be terribly informative. However, tests based on the last 12 years,
reported in the last two rows of the table, include very few observations
1 Fuhrer and Moore (1993b) and Fuhrer (1994) provide evidence of the reaction
function’s goodness-of-fit.46 Jeffrey C. Fuhrer
Table 2
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Results
n




~’t 2 13.8 -.14 -2.03
ft 3 13.4 -.09 -2.34
y~ 2 17.5 -.12
J2~ 2 15.1 -.08 -3,10
1982:1V to 1993:1
,/1"t 1 14.1 -.42 -2.70
ft 1 11.2 -.15 -2.86
-3.23
and thus are also suspect. In general, the magnitude of the coefficient ~0
for the subsample test regressions is larger, although the value of the
ADF test statistic is not uniformly larger. For more discussion on the
time-varying mean of inflation and the issue of the stationarity of the
nominal variables in the model, see Fuhrer (1994). It is assumed for this
paper, as in previous work, that inflation and interest rates are station-
ary and that real output is stationary about a deterministic trend.
The Model
This section will briefly describe the model. The price specification
of the model has been shown to be stable across monetary policy
regimes since 1966 (Fuhrer 1994); the aggregate demand specification
shows some evidence of instability, so some of its parameters are
estimated separately for the pre-1980 and the post-1979 periods; the
reaction function is estimated only on the post-nonborrowed reserves
operating procedure period, 1982:IV to the present. For more detail, see
Fuhrer and Moore (1993b) and Fuhrer (1994).
The I-S Curve
The real economy is represented with a simple I-S curve that relates
the output gap, Yt, to its own lagged values and one lag of the long-term
real interest rate, Pt-1.
fYt = ao + alfyt-! + aayJt-2 + appt-1 + ey, t. (1)
Monetary policy cannot affect potential output or the output gap in the
long run; the output gap is 0 in equilibrium for all feasible monetaryOPTIMAL MONETARY POLICY AND THE SACRIFICE RATIO 47
policies.2 The long-term real rate is the yield to maturity on a hypothet-
ical long-term real bond. The realization of Pt is set equal to the weighted
average of expected real returns on federal funds forecast by the
restricted structural model.
The intertemporal arbitrage condition that equalizes the expected
holding-period yields on federal funds and real long-term bonds is
Pt -- D[Et(Pt+ I) - Pt] = ft - Et(wt+ l), (2)
where D is a constant approximation to Macaulay’s duration. Solving
equation (2) for Pt in terms of Pt+~ and ft - Et(’rrt+l), then recursively
substituting the result into itself, the long-term real rate is an exponen-
tially weighted moving average of the forecast path of the real rate of
return on federal funds.
Pt = I+D      ~.= Et(ft+i- vrt+i+l). (3)
The Reaction Function
The systematic behavior of monetary policy is summarized with a
reaction function in which the monetary authority moves the federal
funds rate in response to deviations of target variables from target.
Limited information estimates of the reaction functions find no evidence
of a response to M2 growth during the post-nonborrowed reserves
operating procedure period. Thus the form of the reaction function is
~
p q
ft = + + + + +
j=o ~=0 ~=0
(4)
The monetary policy reaction function relates the quarterly average of
the federal funds rate to lags of the funds rate, contemporaneous and
lagged levels of the inflation rate, contemporaneous and lagged levels of
the output gap, and contemporaneous and lagged real output growth.
In long-run equilibrium, the funds rate equals the equilibrium real rate
of interest (determined by the I-S curve) plus the target rate of inflation
(implicit in O~o).
a See McCallum (1994) and the writer’s comments in the same volume for further
discussion of this point.48 Jeffrey C. Fuhrer
The Contracting Specification
The contracting specification is identical to that used in Fuhrer and
Moore (1993a), and the reader is referred to that paper for greater detail.
Agents negotiate nominal contracts that remain in effect for four
quarters. The aggregate log price index in quarter t, Pt, is a weighted
average of the log contract prices, xt_i, that were negotiated in the
current and the previous three quarters and are still in effect. The
weights, ~oi, are the proportions of the outstanding contracts that were
negotiated in quarters t - i,
3
pt = Z t"OiXt-i
i=0
(5)
where wi -> 0 and ~roi = 1. A downward-sloping linear function of
contract length is used,
.25+(1.5-i)s, 0<s<-1/6, i=0,...,3. (6)
Let vt be the index of real contract prices that were negotiated on the
contracts currently in effect,
3
Vt-~ ~ roi(Xt-i- Pt-i).
i=0
(7)
Now suppose that agents set nominal contract prices so that the current
real contract price equals the average real contract price index expected
to prevail over the life of the contract, adjusted for excess demand
conditions:
3
xt - Pt = ~, °~iEt(vt+i + 7fdt+i) + ep, t.
i=0
(8)
Substituting equation (7) into equation (8) yields the real version of
Taylor’s (1980) contracting equation,
3                3                    3
Xt -- Pt --- ~.~ J~i(Xt-i " Pt-i) + ~ ~iEt(xt+i- Pt+i) + Y*~ o)iEt(~lt+i) q- ~,t
i=1                      i=1                            i=0
(9)
where fli : Zj wj ~oi+j/(1 - ~:i w~), and y* = y/(1 - Z~ w~) .
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contract price with an average of the real contract prices negotiated in
the recent past and those expected to be negotiated in the near future;
the weights in the average measure the extent to which the past and
future contracts overlap the current one. When output is expected to be
high, the current real contract price is high relative to the real contract
prices on overlapping contracts.
Upon announcement of a disinflation, the rate of inflation begins to
respond to lower current and expected excess demand conditions. Two
aspects of the model moderate inflation’s decline. First, nominal con-
tracts negotiated prior to the disinflation and still in effect cannot (by
assumption) adjust to the news. Thus, the rate of increase in these
nominal contracts continues to feed into the rate of increase in the price
level, albeit with diminishing weight as the disinflation proceeds (equa-
tion (5) implies that today’s inflation rate is a weighted average of the
rates of inflation in the current and last three quarters’ nominal contract
wages). Second, equation (9) implies that the current rate of change of
contract wages depends on lagged and expected rates of change of
inflation. In this way, the persistence in the inflation rate is extended
through overlapping beyond the length of the longest contract,a A
disinflationary policy that shrinks aggregate demand cannot alter this
overhanging dependence on lagged inflation. Hence, a more rapid dis-
inflation will cause greater output disruption than a gradual disinflation.
Parameter Estimates
Fuhrer (1994) provides details of subsample stability of the contract-
ing and I-S parameters, including particulars of the method of estima-
tion. The estimates presented here are taken from that paper. The final
estimates for the reaction function estimated over the post-nonborrowed
reserves operating procedure period (1982:IV to 1993:I) are summarized
in Table 3. Interestingly, the parameters for the contracting specification
appear stable across monetary policy regimes since 1966; the elasticity of
the output gap with respect to the ex ante real rate is also stable across
regimes, while the lags in the I-S curve show some sign of instability.
Thus, the final specification uses contracting parameters and a real rate
elasticity estimated since the mid-1960s, and I-S curve lagged output
parameters that split at 1982:IV.
As shown in the table, the parameters of the I-S curve, the reaction
function, and the contracting specification are of the expected sign and
3 The Taylor specification exhibits the first, but not the second, kind of persistence.
The equation in the Taylor specification that is analogous to equation (9) is xt = f(L-1)p~ +
~/Yt (where f(L-~) is a lead polynomial), so that the change in the contract wage depends
on current and expected inflation, but not on lagged inflation.50 leffrey C. Fuhrer
Table 3
FiML Parameter Estimates: Final Specification
Standard








ao .012 ,004 2.8
ap -.350 .094 -3.7
al 1.527 .115 13.3
a2 -.551 .115 -4.8
ao -.003 .004 -.8
a~l .838 .048 17.4
a~o .271 .091 3,0
a~l ,142 .097 1.5
ay .113 .035 3.3
~&y .424 ,117 3.6
.112 .010 11.1
.002 .001 1.6





Dominant Roots Decay Rate (complex): 6.6% per quarter
are estimated precisely. The slope of the contract distribution is a bit
higher than that estimated in Fuhrer and Moore (1993a,b); the excess
demand parameter is a bit smaller. The reaction function estimates
indicate a significant response to inflation and to real output growth,
as well as a strong tendency to smooth movements in the instrument
(an = 0.8).4 The response of aggregate demand to the ex ante real
interest rate is sizable and precisely estimated.S Aside from the reaction
function parameters, which will be varied in the policy exercises that
follow, the key parameters in the model are ap, the real rate parameter
in the I-S curve; s, the slope of the contract distribution; and ~, the
4 Note that the reaction function indicates a response to contemporaneous output and
inflation. Of course, policymakers have only partial information about the current quarter
by the end of the quarter, so they cannot literally respond to current quarter variables.
Thus, this estimate gives policymakers some information that they could not have had
historically.
s See Fuhrer and Moore (1993b) for a discussion of the magnitude of the estimated real
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sensitivity of contract prices to excess demand. The sensitivity of the
results to uncertainty surrounding these parameter estimates will be
checked below.
Forward-Looking Monetary Policy
Previous work, and the estimated model presented above, have
considered reaction functions that respond only to observable current
and lagged information. This characterization appears to fit the data
quite well. However, in the context of characterizing optimal monetary
policy, the possibility that monetary policy is forward-looking must be
considered, as in Hall and Mankiw (1993). Accordingly, all the param-
eters in tl~e model are reestimated, allowing as many leads of policy
targets to enter as there are lags in the estimated reaction function,
restricting the coefficients on the lead variables to be proportional to the
coefficients on the lagged variables. The estimated weight, on lagged
data is 0.97 with a standard error of 0.53, indicating little support in the
data for a forward-looking reaction function.
A less restricted version of the forward-looking reaction function
allows the funds rate to react to the four-quarter moving averages of the
expected inflation rate, the expected growth rate of real output, and the
expected output gap. The full information estimates of all of these effects
are jointly and individually insignificantly different from zero.
How do we interpret the absence of forward-looking behavior in the
estimated reaction function? After all, Federal Reserve System staff
devote much of their time to preparing forecasts of policy goals.
However, at least two explanations can be offered for the disparity
between this observation and the empirical findings of this study. First,
the forecasts in this specification are model-consistent expectations of
future output and inflation; they may not closely resemble forecasts
assembled by Fed staff. Staff forecasts may resemble fairly unrestricted
projections of actuals on lagged values; the estimated reaction function
already captures this. Second, voting members of the Federal Open
Market Committee are not required to base their decisions on the staff
forecasts. Thus, while the staff may have provided considerable for-
ward-looking information, it may not have been reflected in movements
of the policy instrument. For example, one would not necessarily
characterize the disinflation of the early 1980s as the result of a
forward-looking monetary policy. During this episode, the inflation rate
rose above 10 percent while the unemployment rate stood below 6
percent; only a year later did short-term real rates rise above 1 percent.
Note that in addition to finding no support for forward-looking
policy in the data, this study also finds that the optimal policy frontier52 le~re~ C. Fuhrer
displayed below is approximately invariant to the inclusion of forward-
looking monetary policy.6
The Effect of the Monetary Policy
Rule on the Sacrifice Ratio
The contracting specification employed here implies different sacri-
fice ratios for different monetary policy responses. The more vigorous
the policy response, the more outstanding contracts are caught unex-
pired during a disinflation, and thus the larger are the output costs. The
converse is also true. To illustrate the magnitude of this effect, the
sacrifice ratio implied by the model is computed for a grid of policy
parameters that surround the estimated parameters from the last sub-
sample and extend an order of magnitude in either direction.
To accomplish this, the simplified reaction function
ft -- ft-1 = O¢~’(~t - "It*) q- O~y~[t q-.42Ayt (10)
is used, where a constant is suppressed, the estimated coefficient on the
lagged funds rate of 0.8 is set to 1, and the baseline values for ~ and C~y
are [0.5, 0.1], approximately equal to those estimated for the last sub-
sample and displayed in Table 3. The coefficient on output growth is
held fixed at its estimated value.7 Because these parameters will be
varied by an order of magnitude in either direction, exactly where the
baseline is set is not crucial. The output sacrifice ratio is defined as the
cumulative annual deviation of output from trend over the disinflation,
discounted at 3 percent per year, for each percentage point reduction in
inflation.8
Figure 1 displays the sacrifice ratio as a function of the policy
parameters, varied over a logarithmic grid spanning two orders of
magnitude around the baseline values. Table 4 displays the sacrifice
ratios at selected policy parameter settings. The sacrifice ratio implied by
the estimated reaction function is 4.0, almost exactly as estimated in
Gordon (1985). Using the baseline parameters in the simplified reaction
function (an approximation to the estimated reaction function) yields a
sacrifice ratio of 3.7. The overall range of sacrifice ratios is impressive,
from a low of 0.56 to a high of about 6.0. One striking feature of Figure
6 Fuhrer (1994) provides evidence of this point.
7 Changes in the response to real output growth produce relatively small changes in
the grid of sacrifice ratios. For example, decreasing the response to real growth from 0.42
to 0 increases the sacrifice ratios by 0.05 to 0.4.
8 The sacrifice ratio is computed analytically, rather than by simulation. See the
Appendix for details of computation.OPTIMAL MONETARY POLICY AND THE SACRIFICE RATIO 53
Figure 1


















1 is that the baseline policy’s sacrifice ratio sits atop a large region of
considerably lower sacrifice ratios.
For relatively balanced policies (a~ approximately equal to ay), it is
not possible to reduce the sacrifice ratio below 2.0. The sacrifice ratio is
Table 4
Sacrifice Ratios at Various Policy Settings
Output Gap Response (ey)
Inflation Response (~,,) .01 .03 .06 .10 .25 .63 1.00
.05’ 5.80 4.74 3.31 2.60 1.47 .78 .56
.32 4,24 4.06 3.68 3,38 2.59 1.73 1.36
,50 4.34 4.21 3.92 3.68 2,98 2.10 1.69
1.26 4.81 4.73 4.55 4.40 3.87 3,03 2.55
1.99 5.14 5.08 4.94 4.81 4.36 3.57 3.08
3.15 5.53 5.48 5.37 5.27 4.89 4.16 3.67
5,00 5.96 5.93 5.84 5.75 5.44 4.80 4.3254 Jeffrey C. Fuhrer
strictly decreasing in O~y and almost strictly increasing in a~.9 Signifi-
cantly lower sacrifice ratios can be obtained for markedly unbalanced
policies that respond strongly to output gap deviations and more weakly
to inflation deviations. For inflation responses as low as 0.05, however,
credibility becomes an issue. While the model contains no measure of
credibility, it is likely that a 5-basis-point increase in the funds rate for
every I percentage point that inflation exceeds its target (the top row of
Table 4) would hardly be noticed by the markets and would not be
viewed as a credible disinflationary policy. Policies that attack inflation
even more vigorously than the estimates from the 1980s increases in a~
holding ay constant--can markedly increase the sacrifice ratio.
Thus, this model implies that monetary policy can significantly
affect the sacrifice ratio. Note that in contrast to the evidence presented
in Ball (1994), the costs of disinflation increase with the vigor and rapidity
of the disinflation. Figure 1 suggests that while monetary policy has not
pursued a course that yields the highest sacrifice ratio, neither has it
pursued a course that minimizes the sacrifice ratio. It may be that doing
so would have entailed undesirable trade-offs, perhaps in the variance
of inflation or real output. This possibility is pursued below.
The Timing of Policy Responses
and the Sacrifice Ratio
The simplified reaction function employed in the previous section
assumed contemporaneous response of the funds rate to inflation and
real output. The estimated model, however, shows a significant re-
sponse to lagged inflation, as well as a tendency to keep the funds rate
close to its most recent setting. The latter tendency will be denoted
"interest rate smoothing." How do interest rate smoothing and lagged
responses to policy outcomes affect the sacrifice ratio in this model?10
Table 5 displays the decrease (increase) in the sacrifice ratio relative
to the baseline in Table 4, for various alterations in the timing of the
funds rate response to policy targets. As shown in the first panel of the
table, responding to lagged policy targets instead of the current period’s
expectation of the targets,
9 The sacrifice ratio increases as c~ and cr both approach zero. With extremely low
emphasis on both inflation and ou.tput, the model IS stable, but behaves qualitatively
differently. Under vigorous policy responses, policy moves nominal rates aggressively and
controls short real rates (and thus long real rates). Under weak policy responses, inflation
exhibits wide oscillations that dominate the movements in short real rates. Large real rate
fluctuations cause large output fluctuations, and thus this policy implies a high sacrifice
ratio. Ultimately, such policies are stable, but the dynamics of the economy are quite
different from those under more standard policies.
lo Roberts (1993) looks at the effects of information and response lags in a simplified
annual version of Taylor’s (1980) contracting specification.OPTIMAL MONETARY POLICY AND THE SACRIFICE RATIO 55
Table 5
Change in Sacrifice Ratio Due to Change in Policy Response
Output Gap Response (%,)
Inflation Response (~) .01 .03 .06 ,10 .25
Lagged Response to ~ and y
.05 .31 .25 .16 .12
.32 .40 .38 .33 .30
,50 ,46 .44 .40 ,36
1.26 .61 .59 .56 .54
1.99 .71 .70 .68 .65
3.15 .84 ,83 .81 .79
5.00 1.00 .99 .97 .95
Response to lagged 4-quarter moving averages of
,05 .72 .51 .29      .19
.32 1.01 .91 .73 .60
.50 1.15 1.06 .89
1.26 1.56 1.49 1.35 1.23
1.99 1.84 1.78 1.65 1.54
3.15 2,19 2.14 2.01 1.91
5.00 2.61 2.57 2,45 2.35
















Response to 1-quarterleads of ~ and y
.05 -.27 -.22 -.14 -.11 -.05 -.02 -.01
.32 -.34 -.32 -.28 -.25 -.17 -.10 -,07
,50 -.37 -.36 -.33 -,30 -.23 -.14 -.10
1.26 -.48 -,47 -.45 -.43 -.36 -.26 -.20
1.99 -.55 -.54 -.53 -.51 -.45 -.34 -.27
3.15 -.64 -.63 -.62 -.60 -.55 -.44 -.37
5.00 -.74 -.73 -.72 -,71 -.66 -.56 -.48
Response to 4-quarteraverageleads of ~ and y
.05 -.56 -.45 -.30 -,23 -.11 -.05 -.03
,32 -.73 -.69 -.61 -.54 -.37 -.20 -.14
,50 -.80 -,77 -,70 -.64 -.48 -.28 -.20
1.26 -1.01 -.99 -.94 -.90 -.75 -.53 -.40
1.99 -1.15 -1.13 -1.09 -1.06 -.92 -.69 -.55
3.15 -1.31 -1,29 -1.25 -1,23 -1.11 -.89 -.73
5.00 -1.50 -1.49 -1.46 -1.43 -1.33 -1.11 -.96
increases the sacrifice ratio by I to 100 basis points. For parameter values
approximately like those in the estimated reaction function (o~ = .5,
05, = . 1), the deterioration is relatively small, perhaps 40 basis points.
The next panel shows how much damage can be done by respond-
ing to smoothed averages of lagged quarterly data. In this panel, policy56 Jeffrey C. Fuhrer
responds to lagged four-quarter moving averages of inflation and the
output gap:
4 4
ft -- ft-1 -~ Od ~.25 ~ ql"t-i q- O~y.25 ~ ~lt-j.
i=1
In this case, the sacrifice ratio deteriorates by as much as 2.6; at the
estimated parameter values, the deterioration is a bit less than 1.0.
The bottom two panels display the advantages of responding to
the expected levels of the target variables. In the third panel, policy
responds to the one-quarter lead of both inflation and real output,
ft--ft-1 = a~Et’a’t+l + o~yEt~h+l,
while in the bottom panel, the funds rate responds to the average
expected level of inflation and output over the next four quarters,
4               4
ft -ft-1 = o~.25Et E ~t+i q- o~y.25Et ~ ~h+j.
i=1             j=l
Improvements in the sacrifice ratio of 1.0 to 1.5 are possible, relative to
the baseline of response to (expected) current targets. Overall, compar-
ing a policy that responds to lagged, smoothed information to one that
responds to expected four-quarter-ahead information, the sacrifice ratio
can be improved by as much as 4.0; for parameters like those in the
estimated reaction function, the improvement is about 1.5. Thus, the
model implies that a more forward-looking monetary policy could lower
the sacrifice ratio from a bit above 4.0 to a bit below 3.0.
Figure 2 displays the sacrifice ratio as a function of the lagged
interest rate parameter in the reaction function, o~f, for fixed values of
oq~ and O~y.11 The figure plots the relationship for three pairs of policy
parameters: the baseline setting (oq~ = .5, O~y = .1); a "low output
emphasis" setting (o~ = .5, O~y = .01); and a "high output emphasis"
setting (o~=.5, O~y=l). In each case, for a given emphasis on inflation
and real output, a higher o~f almost always implies a lower sacrifice ratio.
For the baseline and the "low output emphasis" cases, the function
turns up slightly at o~f = .94 and .93, respectively. The function declines
monotonically for the "high output emphasis" case. As expected, the
n The model does not have a unique, stable solution for all values of af, ~, and
As ~f falls below about 0.5, the model requires much larger responses to inflation and
output to remain stable.OPTIMAL MONETARY POLICY AND THE SACRIFICE RATIO 57
Figure 2













.50     .55     .60    .65     .70    .75     .80    .85    .90    .95    1.00
Lagged Interest Rate Coefficient
contour of sacrifice ratios for policies with high emphasis on output
deviations lies strictly below the contour for the baseline and lower
output emphasis policies.
These results suggest the following: (1) To the extent that monetary
policy has responded to lagged and time-averaged observations on
policy goals, it could improve the sacrifice ratio by responding more to
expectations of its goals. (2) Making somewhat gradual changes in the
operating instrument may be justified in that, given preferences over
policy goals, increased interest rate smoothing generally lowers the
sacrifice ratio.
Uncertainty in Estimates of the Sacrifice Ratio
This section will attempt to quantify the robustness of the model’s
sacrifice ratio estimates with respect to parameter uncertainty. Two
related measures will be used. The first estimates the partial derivative
of the sacrifice ratio with respect to the key structural parameters in the
model, assessing the impact on the sacrifice ratio of a two-standard-error
deviation of the parameter from its estimated value. The second mea-
sure computes approximate confidence intervals for the sacrifice ratio,.58 Jeffr~d C. Fuhrer
given the estimated covariance matrix of the estimated (non-policy).
parameters in the model.
Partial Derivatives
An increase in the slope, s, of the contract distribution is expected
to decrease the sacrifice ratio. An increase in the magnitude of the slope
corresponds to a shortening of the average length of outstanding
contracts. More rapidly expiring contracts make the real disruption of a
contractionary demand policy smaller, so the sacrifice ratio should fall.
Numerical derivatives of the sacrifice ratio with respect to s confirm this
intuition: If the slope increased by two standard errors (0.02), the
sacrifice ratio would decrease by 0.6.9 Given the precision of the slope
estimate and the influence of the slope on the implied sacrifice ratio, the
slope is not an important source of uncertainty in the estimates of the
sacrifice ratio.
An increase in the interest sensitivity of the I-S curve, ap, is
expected to increase the sacrifice ratio. For a given response of the short
rate to policy targets during a disinflation, a higher interest rate elasticity
translates into larger output disruption. The numerical estimate of
the partial derivative suggests that a two-standard-error increase in ap
(about 0.19) will yield a 0.3 increase in the sacrifice ratio. Once again,
this parameter appears not to be an important source of uncertainty in
computing the sacrifice ratio.
Finally, an increase in the response of the real contract price to the
output gap, ~, should lower the sacrifice ratio. If less downward
demand pressure is required to lower inflation, then the output cost of
a disinflation should diminish. The numerical estimate of the impact of
~, on the sacrifice ratio implies that a two-standard-error increase in ~/
would yield a decrease of 3.0 in the sacrifice ratio. Thus, ~/ is the
parameter that most contributes to uncertainty about the sacrifice ratio,
given its estimation error and its effect on the sacrifice ratio.
Confidence Intervals
Uncertainty in the estimated sacrifice ratios at various policy param-
eter settings arises from the joint sampling error in the estimated
non-policy parameters in the model, as well as from uncertainty about
the form of the specification. The latter has been set aside as well beyond
the scope of this paper; this section will concentrate on the former.
9 This estimate is based on two-sided numerical derivatives about the estimated
parameters using a differencing interval of 1 x 10-4, The estimate is insensitive to the
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Table 6
Confidence Intervals for Sacrifice Ratios
Policy
Parameters Percentile
o~,,_ OZy 5 10 20 Median 80 90 95
.50 .10 2.16 2.42 2.78 3.73 5.54 7,31 9.62
.05 1.00 .47 .49 .52 .59 .75 1,16 1.42
5.00 .01 3.16 3.65 4.30 6,06 10.10 14.60 20,00
Assuming asymptotic normality, the distribution of the estimated
parameters is
where /~ is the vector of estimated parameter values and f~ is the
estimated covariance matrix of the parameter estimates that underlies
the standard errors presented in Table 3. The k percent confidence
intervals for the sacrifice ratios can be estimated by repeatedly drawing
the parameter vector from this distribution and computing the implied
sacrifice ratio. In principle, the confidence intervals so obtained will
depend on the setting of the policy parameters. The sensitivity of the
confidence intervals will be tested by computing them at three different
policy parameter settings.10
The percentile boundaries for the sacrifice ratio for three policy
settings are displayed in Table 6. As expected, because the sacrifice ratio
has a minimum of 0, the distribution of sacrifice ratios is skewed to the
right. For the baseline case (approximately the estimated policy param-
eters), the median sacrifice ratio is 3.7, and the 60 percent confidence
interval (20th percentile to 80th percentile) is [2.8, 5.5]. The 90 percent
confidence interval (5th to 95th percentile) is [2.2, 9.6], suggesting
considerable upside risk in the estimate of the sacrifice ratio. For the
aggressive output response, the median sacrifice ratio is 0.59, with a 60
percent confidence interval of [0.52, 0.75]. The aggressive output re-
sponse mutes the effect of parameter uncertainty on the implied sacrifice
ratio, markedly compressing the confidence intervals. The lower end of
10 The exercise uses 10,000 draws at each policy parameter setting to estimate the
frequency distributions. Note that the model has no unique, stable solution for values of
ap or 7 below zero; similarly, the admissible range for s is the interval [0, 1/6]. In the
simulations, these parameters are forced to remain within the admissible range. The
standard errors for ap and s are small enough that the number of bound violations is quite
small, about 1 percent for aa and none for s. For % however, approximately 9 percent of
the draws fall below the zero bound.60 leffrey C. Fuhrer
the 90 percent confidence interval differs only by 1 from the upper
bound for this setting, compared with a range of about 7 for the baseline
case. For the weak output response, the 60 percent confidence interval
is [4.3, 10.1], centered about a median of 6.1.
Overall, these confidence intervals suggest that parameter uncer-
tainty, largely attributable to uncertainty about ~, implies considerable
uncertainty about the estimated sacrifice ratios. The effect of parameter
uncertainty on sacrifice ratio uncertainty is amplified as the emphasis on
output in the reaction function decreases--the 80 percent and 90 percent
confidence ranges increase in absolute terms as Ody decreases. However,
at the baseline policy parameter setting, even the 90 percent confidence
interval includes sacrifice ratios only as low as 2.2; recall that these
correspond to high draws for ~,; the truncation of ~ at zero truncates the
mass in the high end of the sacrifice ratio distribution, not the low end.
The Optimal Policy Frontier
A second measure of optimality for monetary policy suggests that
policy attempts to minimize the weighted average of the unconditional
variances of inflation and output (or unemployment) around target
values.11 For many reasonable characterizations of the economy, an
"optimal policy frontier" will exist that depicts the combinations of
inflation variance and output variance attainable by policymakers. The
policy frontier is generally expected to be convex to the origin; that is,
one must trade higher inflation variance for lower output variance, and
vice versa. The frontier describes the variance combinations that are
possible; it says nothing about which combinations are desirable.
However, any reasonable set of preferences over inflation and output
variance will lead to an interior solution in which the policymakers
accept some of both inflation and output variance.
Fuhrer (1994) addresses the characteristics required of a model to
produce a plausible estimate of the optimal frontier and argues that the
final specification detailed in Table 3 meets these criteria. In essence, the
model fits the data quite well, accurately replicating the dynamic
interactions that are found in the data. Thus, the model should yield a
plausible estimate of the optimal policy frontier.
11 It may be that the monetary authority cares about the unconditional variance of
its instrument as well. This concern does not enter the implicit objective function in this
paper, in part because it is not clear why, given policies that yield stable economies, the
variance of the instrument matters once the variances of the ultimate targets are
minimized.OPTIMAL MONETARY POLICY AND THE SACRIFICE RATIO 61
The Definition of the Optimal Policy Frontier
The optimal policy frontier is computed by tracing out the minimum
weighted unconditional variances at different slopes along the frontier
(implicitly, at different relative preferences for inflation versus output
gap variance). Denote the relative weight attached to inflation variance
as /~. Given the model specification described above, Fuhrer (1994)
performs the following optimization
min E/~V(~r - ~r*, O) + (1 -/~)V(~, (11)
over a grid for/~ from 0.05 to 0.95 in increments of 0.05. O includes all
the parameters in the monetary policy reaction function (except the
constant, which cannot affect the unconditional variances). While the
estimated reaction function for the 1980s and 1990s indicates a funds rate
response to the growth rate of output, a response to the output gap as
well is allowed for in the optimal policy exercise. Note that because
optimal combinations of inflation and output variances are attained by
optimally choosing the reaction function parameters, the points on the
frontier imply different values for the sacrifice ratio as well. The
discussion will return to this connection below.
Results
The line labeled "Fuhrer 1994" in Figure 3 displays the optimal
policy frontier presented in Fuhrer (1994), computed from the estimated
reaction function in Table 3, the full sample contracting specification,
and the partially constrained I-S curve. The asterisk indicates the
combinations of unconditional variances that arise for this model at the
estimated parameter values. The estimated frontier has several interest-
ing implications:
The actual policy outcome, summarized by the combination of
unconditional variances at the estimated parameter values, lies
just outside the optimal frontier. Policy in the 1980s has not been
far from optimal according to this metric.
The actual policy outcome lies near the frontier at a point where
the relative emphasis on inflation,/~, is about 0.8, thus implying a
4 to 1 distaste for inflation variability relative to output variability.
Decreasing inflation variance (a move to the left and upward
along the frontier) entails a substantial increase in the variance of
the output gap.
As a check on this estimate of the locus and slope of the optimal
policy frontier, the optimal policy frontiers computed in Fuhrer (1994)62 Jeffrey C. Fuhrer
Figure 3
Optimal Policy Frontiers
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for structural models with different price specifications are reported. The
first model uses the simple Phillips curve
(12)
where ~3i = 1 is imposed. This is a simplified version of the type of
expectations-augmented Phillips curve that appears in the MPS quar-
terly model (see Brayton and Mauskopf 1985). As shown in the line
labeled "MPS" in Figure 3, the optimal frontier for this MPS-style model
lies in about the same position as the frontier for the baseline model. The
contours of the MPS frontier are a bit different from the real contracting
model; the frontier flattens out at a higher output gap standard devia-
tion, suggesting a less severe penalty in output variation for a decrease
in inflation variation at that point. However, the output penalty for
decreasing the standard deviation of inflation below 1.5 percent is
severe, as it is for the relative contracting model.
The second model is the overlapping nominal contracts model of
Taylor (1980). The policy reaction function and the I-S curve are held at
their estimates from Table 3. As shown in the line labeled "TaylorOPTIMAL MONETARY POLICY AND THE SACRIFICE RATIO
(1980)" in Figure 3, the policy frontier for the nominal contracting model
lies well inside the frontiers for the Phillips curve and the real contract-
ing models. The general contours are similar to the other models’
frontiers. 15
Finally, the line labeled "’Taylor (1979)" in Figure 3 displays the
policy frontier from a model developed in Taylor (1979). That frontier
lies much closer to the MPS and real contracting frontiers. With the
exception of the Taylor (1980) nominal contracting model, the other
models imply similar estimates of the optimal policy frontier, suggesting
that the estimate implied by the Fuhrer-Moore model is in the right
ballpark.
What about the "90s?
At considerable econometric hazard, the reaction function for the
period 1988 to the present can be estimated and the sacrifice ratio and
unconditional variances implied by that policy response computed. The
funds rate reaction function for this sample is well represented by
(standard errors in [ ]):
4
ft = 1.24[.120] * (1/4) ~] w~-i + .52[.0281J)￿_i + .028[.005].
i=1
Note that no evidence of interest rate smoothing is present (the lagged
funds rate did not enter significantly in preliminary estimates of the
equation), and the emphasis on inflation has more than doubled over
the estimate for the period 1982-93. The funds rate appears to respond
to a smoothed average of past inflation. The response to real GDP growth
is not significantly different from zero, while the response to the output
gap is higher than during the entire post-1982 period. The actual and
fitted values for this equation appear in the top panel of Figure 4.
Given the estimates of the effects of higher relative emphasis on
inflation, response to smoothed averages, and lack of interest rate
smoothing, the sacrifice ratio implied by this more recent reaction
function can be expected to be high. In fact, the sacrifice ratio implied by
this policy is 7.2, nearly double the sacrifice ratio implied by the
estimates for the entire post-1982 period. The bottom panel of Figure 4
shows the baseline optimal policy frontier from Figure 3, along with the
estimate of the unconditional variance implied by the reaction function
for the period 1988-93. The unconditional variance outcome implied by
the model with the late ’80s and early ’90s reaction function lies yet a bit
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further from the frontier than the outcome implied by the model for a
fixed reaction function for the post-1982 period. Given the degrees of
freedom available to estimate the three parameters of the reaction
function, these results should be taken with a grain of salt. Still, theyOPTIMAL MONETARY POLICY AND THE SACRIFICE RATIO 65
suggest that recently the Fed has chosen a policy that has led to a
modest deterioration in the variance measure of optimality and has
markedly increased the sacrifice ratio.
Interaction of the Two Measures of
Policy Performance
Table 7 presents the policy parameters that are required to attain the
optimal policy responses for various preferences (various points along
the frontier). The final row displays the sacrifice ratio implied by the
model at those parameter settings. The results show the following:
(1) The policy responses required to attain the frontier are more
vigorous than the estimated historical responses. The historical
responses to inflation and output are smaller than all of the
optimal frontier responses, regardless of the relative emphasis
placed on inflation versus output variance.
(2) The sacrifice ratios entailed in moving to the frontier are lower
regardless of preferences than the sacrifice ratio implied by the
model at the historical estimates.
These results suggest that, while monetary policy behavior over the
past 12 years has been reasonably "close to the frontier" when measured
in (variance of inflation, variance of output) space, it may have been
somewhat further from optimal in terms of the sacrifice ratio. The
distance from the frontier and the level of the sacrifice ratio have been
increased in the last six years. More vigorous responses to both inflation
and real output would improve policy, whether measured by the
weighted average of inflation and output variance (in which case the
gain is relatively small) or by the sacrifice ratio (in which case the gain
could be substantial).
Table 7
Sacrifice Ratios along the Optimal Policy Frontier, 1982 to 1993
Reaction Function Parameters
Optimal parameter value for p, =
Estimated
Mnemonic Value .06 .22 .42 .54 .70 .82 ,98
%,o .27 .40 .40 .41 .41 .40 ,41 .48
~,~ .14 .18 .24 .26 .27 ,28 .29 .37
OZy .11 2.91 1.56 .91 .67 ,42 ,28 .19
o~,~, .42 .57 .54 .52 .51 .50 ,50 .48
~ .84 .76 .81 ,83 .84 .85 .87 1.00
Sacrifice Ratio 4.01 1.26 1.70 2.18 2.46 2,89 3.23 3.86
1988 to Present 7.2066 leffrey C. Fuhrer
A Three-Way Optimal Policy Frontier?
The foregoing results show that one can improve both the sacrifice
ratio and the unconditional variances by moving onto the two-dimen-
sional optimal policy frontier. Because all of the sacrifice ratios on the
frontier displayed in Table 7 are below 4, all of the points on the frontier
of Figure 3 are improvements relative to the asterisk, in all three
dimensions. Thus, regardless of preferences over the objectives dis-
cussed here, actual policy performance cannot be on the surface of the
three-dimensional frontier.
From the optimal three-dimensional frontier the maximum efficient
sacrifice ratio can be determined for any preferences over the three
objectives. Here, the three-dimensional frontier is computed for a
variety of preferences (weights) over the two variances and the sacrifice
ratio. Formally, the augmented optimization problem is
min [/zlV(~r - ~r*, 0) +/zaV(~, 0) + (1 -/zl -/~2)A(0)], (13)
where A(O) summarizes the dependence of the sacrifice ratio, A, on the
parameter settings in the model. The weights (/z,, ~2, 1 - ~1 - ~) take values
on the unit simplex.
Interestingly, only for extremely imbalanced preferences does the
sacrifice ratio exceed 4. A policy with 80 percent weight on inflation
deviations, and a total of 20 percent weight on output deviations and the
sacrifice ratio, yields a sacrifice ratio of 3.6. Even a policy that places 98
percent weight on inflation, and 1 percent each on output and the
sacrifice ratio, implies an efficient sacrifice ratio of 4.6. Thus, only for
policies that are extremely imbalanced in their concern for inflation
would the efficient sacrifice ratio rise as high as 4; sacrifice ratios of 7 are
almost certainly inefficient.16
Other Measures of Optimality
This paper ignores at least one other potential measure of optimal-
ity: the steady-state cost of nonzero rates of inflation. While this cost
could be an important counterbalance to other costs discussed above, it
has been omitted for two reasons. First, the evidence on the quantitative
significance of such costs for low levels of inflation is mixed at best.17
16 Note that this minimization problem was not nearly as robust numerically as the
two-dimensional optimal frontier problem described in Fuhrer (1994). The reason may be
that, at least for this model and data set, concern for output variance is not sufficiently
independent of concern for the sacrifice ratio. These two objectives are sufficiently
correlated that it may not always be possible to precisely identify a well-defined minimum
of the function.
17 Motley (1994) and Lucas (1994) are typical of two different approaches to estimating
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Second, the model used here has no explicit welfare function and,
further, implies no effect of the level of inflation on real output in the
long run.
Conclusions
The optimal policy frontier implied by the Fuhrer-Moore model
indicates that the actual performance of the economy lies quite close to
the frontier. In addition, the shape of the frontier implies that a
reduction in the standard deviation of inflation below 2 percent entails
an enormous increase in output variability. Similarly, reducing the
standard deviation of output below 2 percent entails a large increase in
inflation variability. Policy frontiers for alternative specifications--an
MPS Phillips curve and a Taylor nominal contracting model show that
the qualitative feature of sharp trade-offs below a threshold for either
inflation or output variability is preserved across models. This consis-
tency was noted in Taylor (1992).
While recent monetary policy may have resulted in performance
that is not too far from the two-dimensional variance policy frontier,
policy may have been considerably less efficient with respect to the
output sacrifice ratio. Estimates of the sacrifice ratio implied by the
model using reaction functions estimated over the last 12 years run from
moderate (about 4) to high (above 7).
Regardless of underlying policy preferences, monetary policy could
have achieved a lower sacrifice ratio by responding more to expectations
of policy targets, rather than to lagged and current observations on
targets. The improvement in the sacrifice ratio ranges from about I to 4,
relative to a lagged response reaction function.
Improvements in the sacrifice ratio and in the variability of inflation
and output can be attained by moving closer to the optimal policy
frontier. If the estimate of the most recent reaction function is taken
literally, moving to the frontier would halve the sacrifice ratio and
modestly decrease inflation and output variances. Regardless of prefer-
ences over inflation and output variability, improvements in either
measure of optimality are obtained by more vigorous response to both
inflation and real output.
The link between monetary policy and the sacrifice ratio in this
paper arises through the overlapping contract structure in the model.
Models in which credibility plays a central role may reach different
conclusions. Models that employ a traditional Phillips curve will imply
that monetary policy cannot affect the sacrifice ratio. Thus, all the
conclusions reached here must be viewed as model-dependent.68 Jeffrey C. Fuhrer
Appendix
Computing the Sacrifice Ratio
All of the linear rational expectations models in this paper may be expressed as
0
~ Hixt+i q- ~ HiEt(xt+i) =
i=-r            i=1
(A1)
where ~- and 8 are positive integers, xt is a vector of variables, and the Hi are conformable
square coefficient matrices.
The generalized saddlepath procedure of Anderson and Moore (1985) is used to
solve equation (A1) for expectations of the future in terms of expectations of the present
and the past. For a given set of initial conditions, Et(xt+k+i); k > 0, i = -~, .... -1, if
equation (A1) has a unique solution that grows no faster than a given upper bound, that
procedure computes the vector autoregressive representation of the solution path,
(A2)
In the models considered here, the roots of equation (A2) lie on or inside the unit circle.
Using the fact that Et(xt_g) = Xt-k for k --> 0, equation (A2) is used to derive
expectations of the future in terms of the realization of the present and the past. These
expectations are then substituted into equation (A1) to derive a representation of the
model that is denoted the observable structure,
0
~ Sixt+i= ~t" (A3)
The model includes two auxiliary equations for computing the sacrifice ratio. The
first simply allows for a shock, ~bt, that causes a permanent shift in the steady-state value
of the inflation rate, ~r:
~rt = ~rt-~ + ~bt.
In the reaction function, the funds rate responds to deviations of inflation from ~r. The
second equation implicitly defines Yt as the expected discounted sum of the output gaps
from the present to the infinite future:la
Yt - 0.9924 * EtYt+~ = fdt.
The sacrifice ratio is then obtained by solving equations (A3) for the contemporane-
ous impact of a unit decrease in the steady-state inflation rate (a unit pulse in ~bt) on the
discounted sum of output gaps, Yr. Thus, the sacrifice ratio, A, is the (i,j)th entry of S0-~,
where So is the contemporaneous coefficient matrix in equation (A3), i denotes the row of
So defining the sacrifice ratio, and j denotes the column corresponding to the shock ~bt. The
entry is divided by 4 to convert it to the appropriate units.
Solving this difference equation forward yields Yt = ~=o i-
~ Yt+i.OPTIMAL MONETARY POLICY AND THE SACRIFICE RATIO 69
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It is a rare pleasure to read a paper about the sacrifice ratio written
by someone under the age of 50. The sacrifice ratio is one of those
subjects in macroeconomics that is at the heart of many practical policy
discussions but, at the same time, rarely finds its way into serious
academic publications. It is good to see someone trying to be both
practical and serious at the same time.
My comments on Jeffrey Fuhrer’s paper are divided into three areas:
motivation, methodology, and results. In each area, I have some
disagreements with the author.
Before I launch into these disagreements, however, let me empha-
size one point of agreement: This type of exercise is exactly what is
needed if research is to help improve the conduct of monetary policy. In
practice, the Fed follows a seat-of-the-pants approach to making policy.
The Fed does not bind itself to any explicit monetary rule, and it
probably will continue to exercise such discretion for the foreseeable
future. But this kind of research on monetary rules is nonetheless
useful. Even if a monetary rule is never adopted, research on alternative
rules can potentially show the ways in which policy has overreacted or
underreacted to economic conditions. In essence, this kind of research
can improve seat-of-the-pants policymaking by raising the sensitivity of
Alan Greenspan’s posterior.
*Professor of Economics, Harvard University.DISCUSSION 71
Motivation
Why do we care about the sacrifice ratio? The sacrifice ratio was a
key issue in the late 1970s when prices were rising about 10 percent per
year. Everyone wanted to reduce inflation, but people disagreed about
how the large the costs would be in terms of lost output. Economists
proposed various ways to reduce the cost of disinflation: gradualism,
cold-turkey, wage-price controls, credibility, tax-based incomes policy,
profit-sharing, and on and on. Yet everyone seemed to agree that a
smaller sacrifice ratio was better than a bigger one. If we are going to
reduce inflation from 10 to 3 percent, as we in fact did, it is better to lose
less output than more in the process.
The question that this paper addresses, however, is different in a
subtle but important way. Rather than discussing the one-time cost of a
transition from a high-inflation policy to a low-inflation policy, this
paper considers how the ongoing policy rule affects the sacrifice ratio.
This rule has the Fed trying to achieve a target level of inflation, but
sometimes the Fed changes the target for no good reason. The sacrifice
ratio measures the cost in output when the Fed gets a negative
1-percentage-point shock to its target inflation rate.
It is not at all clear why we should care about the sacrifice ratio in
this way. It is true that a larger sacrifice ratio means a larger output loss
when the Fed’s inflation target happens to fall, but it also means a larger
output gain when the target happens to rise. As long as the natural rate
of output is below the social optimum, as it probably is for various
reasons, a larger sacrifice ratio is desirable during periods of rising
inflation. We might suspect that a larger sacrifice ratio means more
volatile output. But if this is the source of concern about the sacrifice
ratio, then it is better to look at volatility directly, as in fact the paper
does. At one point in this paper, the sacrifice ratio enters as an argument
in the Fed’s objective function, but its inclusion is not well-motivated.
Holding the mean and variance of output and inflation constant, why
should policymakers care what their policy rule implies for the sacrifice
ratio? My guess is that they should not.
Methodology
The approach that the paper takes is to estimate a simple macro-
economic model of the economy--an I-S equation, an aggregate-supply
equation, and the Fed’s interest-rate reaction function--and then to
simulate the model for alternative policy parameters. In this way, we can
compute the policy frontier in terms of inflation and output volatility. We
can then see the trade-off between volatility in output and volatility in
inflation and how far actual policy has been from the efficient frontier.72 N. Gregory Mankiw
The utility of this exercise, of course, depends on the credibility of
the model and the estimation procedure. Both are open to dispute. Ever
since Robert Lucas (1976) called attention to the neglected role of
expectations, economists have been skeptical about macroeconometric
models. The particular model in this paper does take a step in the
direction of incorporating forward-looking expectations. But, nonethe-
less, the degree of forward-looking behavior is quite limited. Expecta-
tions enter the I-S equation, for example, only through long-term
interest rates. Forward-looking consumers are completely absent. Those
who found the Lucas critique compelling two decades ago will not find
much solace in this paper.
In my view, Christopher Sims (1980) provided an even more
important critique of macroeconometric models. Sims argued that these
models were estimated with "incredible" identifying assumptions. This
paper, for example, contains almost no discussion of the identification
problem. A good rule of thumb is that when an author fails to mention
his identifying assumptions, the reader should presume they are not
appealing. In this particular paper, it is hard to find any variable in the
estimated model that is exogenous. If this model is identified at all,
identification must come from the tight structure that the model imposes
on the data.
This brings me to my last concern about methodology--the partic-
ular theoretical structure. In some ways, I am quite sympathetic with the
theory used here. It is a variant of a sticky-price model, in which
long-term, staggered contracts cause the overall level of wages and
prices to adjust only gradually to changes in aggregate demand.
Yet we must admit that we do not know very much about the
details of aggregate supply. The theoretical literature on sticky prices
does not point in a single direction about how to specify a price-
adjustment equation. In some sticky-price models, firms adjust prices at
periodic intervals; in others, firms adjust prices at any time by paying a
fixed menu cost. In some models, firms set prices at fixed levels between
adjustments; in others, firms specify a predetermined path of prices. In
some models, firms face only aggregate shocks; in others, firms face
idiosyncratic shocks as well. These details might seem quite secondary,
but in fact they turn out to have important ramifications for the
dynamics of the economy.
A paper by Andrew Caplin and Daniel Spulber (1987) shows how
important subtle modeling issues can be. Caplin and Spulber examine a
model in which firms adjust prices infrequently because they face menu
costs. Nonetheless, in their model, the overall price level moves one-
for-one with changes in the money supply, leading to monetary neu-
trality. Intuitively, the reason is that the few firms that do adjust prices
change them by large amounts; moreover, the larger the change in the
money supply, the greater the number of firms that choose to pay theDISCUSSION 73
cost of adjustment. In this model, even though prices are sticky at the
firm level, the overall price level appears quite flexible.
I bring up this theoretical result not because it has great practical
relevance but because it sounds a warning for those who think we
understand the right way to model the dynamics of the price level.
Seemingly innocuous assumptions about the microeconomic price-
adjustment process can lead to profound and surprising conclusions
about macroeconomic dynamics in general and monetary policy in
particular. Thus, any conclusions reached in this paper rest heavily on
the Fuhrer-Moore model of price adjustment. Unless we are committed
to that particular model, we should treat any policy conclusions with
more than the usual dose of skepticism.
Where, then, does this ambiguity about modeling price adjustment
leave those of us interested in serious, practical research on monetary
policy? It leaves us in a position where we must admit the limits of our
knowledge. In particular, three modest conclusions are warranted. First,
we should acknowledge that many of the various models of monetary
non-neutrality in the literature have some appeal. We have no reason to
commit ourselves to any one of them. Second, we should avoid asking
our models to answer very subtle questions, as this paper often does.
The more subtle the question, the more likely the answer is to be model-
dependent, and the more skeptical we have a right to be. Third, when
evaluating rules for monetary policy, we need to admit our ignorance
and try to find rules that are robust. That is, rather than trying to find
the rule that is optimal in any single model, we should be looking for
rules that are reasonably good across a wide variety of competing models.
Results
Having questioned this paper’s motivation and methodology, let
me now turn to my last topic--the results. One of the conclusions of this
paper is that a slower disinflation is less costly than a rapid disinflation.
In other words, as judged by the sacrifice ratio, gradualism is better than
cold-turkey. This is, of course, one of the classic issues regarding
disinflation. And I am deeply skeptical of Fuhrer’s resolution of it.
In a recent paper, Laurence Ball (1994) addresses this question using
an approach that imposes less theoretical structure. Ball identifies 28
episodes in OECD countries in which an economy experienced a large,
sustained reduction in inflation. He then computes the sacrifice ratio for
each episode. He shows that the more rapid the disinflation, the smaller
the sacrifice ratio. This is just the opposite of what Fuhrer concludes. In
my view, Ball’s empirical regularity is more compelling than Fuhrer’s
model simulations. At the very least, to convince me that he is right,
Fuhrer needs to explain how his model’s simulations can be made
consistent with Ball’s finding.74 N. Gregond Mankiw
Table 1
Expected and Actual Inflation: The Volcker Episode
Percent
CEA Forecast







Note: CEA Forecast is from the 1981 Economic Report of the President, p, 178.
A case in point is the Volcker episode. The early 1980s saw the most
rapid disinflation in recent U.S. history. When I do a back-of-the-
envelope calculation of the sacrifice ratio for this episode, I find that it
was much smaller than most economists had predicted in advance
(Mankiw 1994, p. 312). Certainly, the cost of this rapid disinflation was
not much larger than had been predicted. Thus, this episode seems
inconsistent with a key conclusion of this paper.
Finally, let me say something about credibility. In many models of
aggregate supply, such as Stanley Fischer’s (1977) model of nominal-
wage contracts, policy has real effects by causing the price level to
deviate from the price level that people expected at some point in the
past. In this class of models, credibility is crucial for determining the
sacrifice ratio in any particular episode of disinflation. Yet, in the
introduction of this paper, Fuhrer dismisses credibility with the state-
ment, "However, the importance of credibility in the conduct of
monetary policy must be viewed as marginal at best. It is hard to argue
that the high cost of the disinflation in the 1980s arose because monetary
policy did not act credibly."
I do not think it is hard to argue that at all. Table 1 shows the
inflation rates predicted at the beginning of 1981 by the Council of
Economic Advisers. The table shows that the Volcker policy was not
credible even to the Administration that had appointed Volcker. The
Council forecast only a gradual reduction in inflation, whereas in fact
Volcker oversaw a rapid reduction. If we add the first two forecasting
errors, we find that the price level at the end of 1982 was 9 percentage
points below the price level forecast at the beginning of 1981. These data
are completely consistent with the view that monetary policy affects real
output by causing the price level to deviate from the expected price
level. In the end, it is hard to draw strong conclusions from the Volcker
episode about the effects of credibility. The only sure lesson from this
episode is that credibility is hard to establish.DISCUSSION 75
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Martin S. Eichenbaum*
The purpose of this session is to consider the question "How
Efficient Has Monetary Policy Been?" Jeffrey Fuhrer and John Taylor
attack this question within the confines of simple but explicit dynamic
models that stress the importance of nominal rigidities in goods and
labor markets. Indeed, the two papers share virtually identical views
about the nature of the monetary transmission mechanism and similar
predictions about the effects of changes in monetary policy. Roughly
speaking, the Fuhrer paper can be thought of as a state-of-the-art
econometric attempt to implement the qualitative vision embodied in
the Taylor paper.
The Framework
The vision itself is elegant in its simplicity. To a first approximation,
it can be summarized as follows.
1. Monetary policy actions induce changes in short-term nominal
interest rates.
2. For various reasons, the inflation rate is "sticky" and does not
respond immediately either to developments on the real side of
the economy or to Federal Reserve actions.
3. Given an expectations model of the term structure and interest
rate smoothing by the Federal Reserve, a policy-induced rise in
*Professor of Economics, Northwestern University. The author thanks Charles Evans
for numerous conversations and help in preparing this comment.SUMMARY DISCUSSION 77
the short-term nominal interest rate induces a rise in the long-
term real interest rate.
4. The rise in the long-term real interest rate generates a fall in
aggregate demand, which causes actual output to fall. By how
much depends crucially on the extent to which the Federal Reserve
can lower the long-term real interest rate and on the sensitivity of
aggregate demand to changes in the long-term real interest rate.
5. With a lag, monetary policy affects inflation through its effect on
deviations of actual from potential output.
Strikingly, this vision abstracts entirely from all other rigidities,
such as the financial market imperfections that have been the focus of so
much debate in the academic literature and-~I might add~Chairman
Greenspan’s recent testimony to the House Banking Committee. Credit
crunches, liquidity constraints, the deficit, and the collapse of traditional
money demand, loan demand, and velocity relationships--all are sim-
ply absent from the framework. So the key questions are: Have the
authors made the "right" decisions in modeling the monetary transmis-
sion mechanism, and how can we tell? That the answers matter for
assessing the efficiency of monetary policy is obvious. Frankly, Chairman
Greenspan’s defense of recent monetary policy is simply incoherent from
the perspective of the vision embodied in the Fuhrer and Taylor papers.
How convincing is the evidence presented by Fuhrer and Taylor for
their vision? Not very. To begin with, neither paper offers any evidence
whatsoever regarding the central implication of the model: the existence
of a significant trade-off between the volatility of inflation and output.
This is because no such evidence exists. Perhaps Fuhrer and Taylor
could rationalize the absence of such a relationship as reflecting subop-
timal behavior on the part of policymakers. But absent a convincing
rationalization, the apparent lack of a trade-off must be viewed as a
grave embarrassment for the model.
Next, neither paper offers any direct evidence on the plausibility of
their view of the monetary transmission mechanism. Consider, for
example, the key assumption that aggregate demand depends sensi-
tively on long-term interest rates. Which rate? And where is the
evidence that aggregate demand actually does depend on it? More
fundamentally, what evidence do we have that the Federal Reserve can
significantly lower the unnamed long-term real interest rate by lowering
the current nominal federal funds rate? In fact, it is exactly the absence
of such evidence that has led various researchers to look at alternative,
perhaps complementary models of the monetary transmission mecha-
nism that stress frictions in financial markets.1 Perhaps these types of
See, for example, Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992).78 Martin S. Eichenbaum
frictions could be incorporated into Fuhrer’s and Taylor’s models. But
(almost) surely their quantitative characterization of efficient monetary
policy would then change.
To be fair, Fuhrer has estimated his models in other papers, and the
"fit"--for the limited number of variables that he looks at--is reasonably
good. But given the level at which the model is formulated, it would be
shocking if it was not. After all, if you start off by assuming that output
is an unconstrained AR(2) about a deterministic trend (with a correction
for a long-term real interest rate), how wrong can you go? Similarly, if
you start off by assuming that the short-term interest rate is an
unconstrained distributed lag of itself and current and lagged values of
output and inflation, how wrong can you go?
If the issue is finding a way to statistically reject the model, that is
easy. Just take a stand on what the mysterious long-term interest rate is
and test the term structure theory embedded in the model. For any
long-term interest rate I can think of, that theory is soundly rejected. In
fact I would conjecture that if anyone ever constructs a "top 10" list of
economic hypotheses that have been tested and rejected, the risk-
neutral, expectations model of the term structure will surely be in-
cluded. So overall tests of the model are not the issue. Relative to a
small, selective number of variables,, the fit is fine. But once we include
other key variables whose behavior is central to the monetary transmis-
sion mechanism being considered, then the model is easy to reject.
A more interesting question is whether the evidence that is pre-
sented provides support for the Fuhrer/Taylor vision of how monetary
policy works. The answer is no. McCallum (1994) shows this in a
particularly dramatic way. One of the key parameters in Fuhrer’s model
is % which governs the sensitivity of contract prices to excess demand
conditions (see equation 8). Fuhrer estimates ~ to be small and statisti-
cally insignificantly different from zero. But if this parameter is equal to
zero, then the model dichotomizes, prices are exogenous, and the
nominal contracting features are simply irrelevant to the real side of the
economy. So interpreted, Fuhrer’s empirical work is stunningly sup-
portive of a real business cycle view of the world. The claim that his
model fits well is equivalent to the claim that a real business cycle model
fits well. In this sense, Fuhrer’s answer to the question "’Has monetary
policy been efficient?" is: "Who cares?"
A VAR Approach
I am not convinced by Fuhrer’s evidence that we live in a real
business cycle world. To ensure that readers of his paper do not develop
an intense yearning for lakeside property, I will develop the connectionSUMMARY DISCUSSION
between the Fuhrer and Taylor papers and the recent vector autoregres-
sion (VAR)-based literature that tries to document what the effects of
exogenous shocks to monetary policy are. This link will be used to do
two things. First, I show that the current formulation of the Fuhrer/
Taylor model---certainly as it pertains to the behavior of the Federal
Reserve--is implausible, although fixable. Second, this link makes it
possible to point to a literature that, in contrast to the Fuhrer and Taylor
papers, provides strong evidence of monetary non-neutralities. While
this literature has not.yet resolved the nature of the monetary transmis-
sion mechanism, it is assembling a set of "facts" that any plausible
business cycle theory ought to be consistent with.
Fuhrer’s model and his identifying assumptions about the nature of
shocks to monetary policy map perfectly into the VAR literature that
focuses on the following simple question: How do monetary policy
actions affect the economy? The central problem in answering this
question is that monetary policy actions often reflect policymakers’
responses to non-monetary developments. For the sake of precision, I
will refer to the rule that relates policymakers’ actions to the state of the
economy as the feedback rule. To the extent that a policy action is an
outcome of the feedback rule, the response of economic variables
reflects the combined effects of the action itself and of the variables that
policy reacts to. To isolate the effects of Federal Reserve policy actions
per se, we need to identify the component of those actions that is not
reactive to other.variables. I refer to this component as the exogenous
component of a monetary policy action. I call the realizations of this
component exogenous monetary policy shocks. With this definition,
monetary policy actions are the sum of two components: the feedback
rule and the exogenous shock. The VAR literature focuses on the
question: "How does the economy respond to an exogenous monetary
policy shock?"
A harder and more interesting question is "What is the impact on
the economy of a change in the monetary authority’s feedback rule?" It
is exactly this type of question that underlies Fuhrer and Taylor’s
characterizations of the optimal frontier between volatility in inflation
and in output. But before we trust the models’ answers to this type of
difficult question, we should insist that those models give us the right
answer to the simple question that is the focus of the VAR literature.
Granted, giving the right answer to the simple question is not a
sufficient condition for acting on the implications of a particular model.
But this test does help narrow the field of choice and give guidance to
the development of future theory.
To see the connection between the Fuhrer paper and the VAR
literature, recall that Fuhrer characterizes monetary policy via a time
invariant linear policy rule of the form:8O Martin S. Eichenbaum
j=l j=0     j=0
(1)
Here ft denotes the time t federal funds rate, wt is the time t inflation
rate, Yt is the time t deviation of the log of output from a deterministic
trend, and n is a positive integer. The term eft is the time t exogenous
shock to policy. It is assumed to be orthogonal to the other variables on
the right-hand side of equation (1). Broadly speaking, eft can be
interpreted as reflecting the fact that actual policy decisions are the
outcome of the ongoing interaction of policymakers with different
preferences and constituencies that have different political strengths at
different times. In his Appendix, Fuhrer interprets eft as reflecting
exogenous shocks to policymakers’ target rates of inflation. Similar
interpretations can be derived from Taylor’s model.
Under Fuhrer’s assumptions, exogenous shocks to policy are easy
to measure: They are just the residuals from equation (1). So the
dynamic response of the economy to a policy action corresponds to the
impulse response function from an exactly identified VAR in which we
impose a particular Wold ordering on ft, ~rt, and Yr. The only aspect of
the ordering that is relevant (for our purposes) is that ft appears behind
Yt and ~rt. In simple English, this corresponds to two key assumptions:
(i) policymakers setft on the basis of current and lagged values of output
and inflation, as well as lagged values of ft, and (ii) contemporaneous
movements in ft do not affect current output or the current inflation rate.
Policy shocks affect these 9ariables with at least a one-quarter lag.
Figure I displays the dynamic response functions of ft, Yt, and ~rt to
a one-standard-deviation shock to eft. This shock will be referred to as an
FF policy shock. Solid lines correspond to point estimates, while the
dotted lines denote a two-standard-deviation band about the point
estimates. These were estimated from a trivariate VAR that included
four lags of ft, Yt, and ~t. The sample period was 1966:I to 1992:III. A
number of interesting points emerge from Figure 1.
o
Consistent with the notion that the Federal Reserve smooths
interest rates, positive FF policy shocks generate persistent but
transitory movements in the federal funds rate (top panel).
Positive FF policy shocks are associated with persistent declines
in aggregate output (middle panel), with the peak effect occur-
ring roughly after one and one-half years. Assuming a discount
rate of 3 percent per year, the discounted percentage-point loss
in real GNP induced by a 100-basis-point shock to the federal
funds rate is roughly 2.75. While the experiment underlying this
statistic does not correspond to the one underlying standardSUMMARY DISCUSSION 81
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Note: Estimated over sample period 1966:1 to 1992:111.82 Martin S. Eichenbaum
estimates of the sacrifice ratio, it is interesting that the number is
in the ballpark of the sacrifice ratio reported by Fuhrer.
Finally, notice that the specification has very strange implica-
tions for the relationship between monetary policy shocks and
movements in inflation (bottom panel). In fact, the infamous
price puzzle emerges with a vengeance. This is the result that a
positive shock to the federal funds rate is associated with a
prolonged rise in the inflation rate.2
The problem is that the Federal Reserve reaction function used by
Fuhrer (and Taylor) is overly parsimonious. Christiano, Eichenbaum,
and Evans (1994) argue that the key variable that has been omitted from
the reaction function is some measure of commodity prices, which acts
as an indicator of future inflation. On several occasions in the postwar
era, a rise in the inflation rate was preceded by a rise in the federal funds
rate and in commodity prices. An example is the oil shock in 1974.
Identification schemes that treat the federal funds rate as the Federal
Reserve’s policy instrument but that do not include commodity prices in
the Fed’s feedback rule have the perverse implication that contraction-
ary policy shocks lead to a sustained rise in both the price level and the
rate of inflation. Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1994) and Sims
and Zho (1994) show that allowing for a measure of commodity prices in
the feedback rule resolves the price puzzle. It is hard to say what the
impact of this modification would be in Fuhrer’s model. Still, it is clear
that the current specification is troublesome, to say the least. Even
researchers who have stressed the ability of monetary policy to shift the
aggregate supply curve of output by affecting the price and quantity of
working capital do not believe that contractionary policy actions are
followed by prolonged rises in the inflation rate. On this basis, I
conclude that while the reaction function used by Fuhrer and Taylor is
useful for pedagogical purposes, it is misspecified for the purposes of
empirical work.
An obvious question is whether the evidence for non-neutralities
survives including commodity prices in the Federal Reserve’s reaction
function. The answer is yes. In contrast to Fuhrer’s paper, the (recent)
VAR literature provides strong, credible evidence that shocks to mone-
tary policy have important effects on aggregate economic activity. In
particular, according to this literature, contractionary policy shocks have
the following properties: (i) they are associated with a rise in the federal
funds rate and a fall in monetary aggregates like nonborrowed reserves,
total reserves, and M1; (ii) they lead to persistent declines in real GDP,
employment, retail sales, and nonfinancial corporate profits as well as
See Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1994) and Sims and Zho (1994).SUMMARY DISCUSSION 83.
increases in unemployment and manufacturing inventories; (iii) they
generate sharp, persistent declines in commodity prices; and (iv) the
aggregate price level does not respond to them for roughly a year. After
that, the price level declines. Given my space constraints, I refer the
reader to Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1994) or Cochrane (1994)
for discussions of these results. Ongoing work is aimed at using VAR
methods in conjunction with sectoral and micro data to provide a more
detailed view of the monetary transmission mechanism.3 It is far from
clear just what picture will emerge when all is said and done. It is clear
that pure real business cycle theories cannot reproduce the patterns that
have already been documented. Whether Fuhrer’s model can do so is an
open question. We won’t know until the model is enriched to have a
more realistic specification of the Fed’s reaction function and we see the
constrained impulse response functions.
If Fuhrer’s model passes the impulse response function "test" and
direct evidence is presented on the plausibility of the Fuhrer/Taylor view
of the monetary transmission mechanism, then the answers these
papers give us to the hard questions that ultimately interest us merit
very serious consideration. But until then, their answers must be taken
with a very large grain of salt.
Conclusion
Let me conclude by emphasizing that while I have criticized various
aspects of the Fuhrer and Taylor papers, there is much to admire in
them. Fuhrer in particular takes an explicit stand on the monetary
transmission mechanism and ruthlessly pursues the logic of his model
to tell us--bottom line--what he thinks the sacrifice ratio is and what
different policy rules would imply for the operating characteristics of the
economy. There just is not enough of this kind of work being done. To
be useful in the policy process, researchers need to help policymakers
understand the quantitative implications of their actions as well as the
quantitative trade-offs involved in adopting different policy regimes.
Granted, the costs of proceeding this way are high. But what is the
alternative? The social marginal product of a researcher announcing that
the Federal Reserve should push the LM curve to the right is about as
high as that of praying for a positive technology shock. While I have
reservations about the Fuhrer and Tay!or papers, they’re not just
praying for good shocks.
3 See, for example, Gertler and Gilchrist (1991) on the role of financial market frictions
and the impact of monetary policy shocks on large and small firms.84 Martin S. Eiehenbaum
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